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A threat to the ambiguity view? For many tasks in intensional semantics, it has become standard
to assume that DPs in opaque contexts are ambiguous at least between a “transparent” and an
“opaque” reading (and maybe more, given the possibility of multiple embedding). One way to
derive this ambiguity is via LF movement; another is to stipulate phonologically null pronouns
denoting possible worlds in the structure of DPs [2].
Koralus [5] has recently cast doubt on such a view. Relying on an ambiguity test [13] according to
which ellipsis requires identity of interpretation, he has pointed out the possibility of the discourse
(1) Mike actually wanted to meet the winner and Cathy nearly might have.
in the situation where Mike wanted to meet whoever won (the traditional de dicto reading) whereas
Cathy wanted to meet the particular person who had not won but was very likely to (even though
Cathy was perhaps unaware of that—the de re reading of the winner w.r.t. want, although not
w.r.t. might). As the possibility of ellipsis in (1) shows, Koralus argues, there is no de dicto / de re
ambiguity for deﬁnite descriptions.
Whereas there might be potential ways out of the predicament, e.g. if one endorses the mediæval
theory of ampliation [6], according to which a term in an opaque context denotes counterfactual
as well as actual things (so that the identity-of-interpretation condition is observed in (1)),—the
alternative solutions are most likely not without their own problems. The present contribution
examines the force of Koralus’s criticisms and aims to show that they are not as disastrous for the
ambiguity view as Koralus claims.
Koralus’ cases are nothing special. If Koralus’ identity assumption were correct, the case of (2)
would be nearly as problematic for a theory of ellipsis as his (1).
(2) John thinks Rafael is the winner, but Mary doubts that he is ?.
The reason is, of course, that on the world-pronoun theory any predicate has to be supplied with a
world argument, so that the ellipsis of the winner in the second conjunct of (2) violates the identity-
of-interpretation condition, as the world argument of is the winner in manipulated by John thinks
in the licensor and by Mary doubts in the ellipsis site.
Strictly speaking, in the case of (2) Koralus’ viewpoint can be defended. In formal semantics it
is often assumed [8, 9, 11], the defender may point out, that the main predicate of a clause does
not take a world argument itself but rather is evaluated at the index borne by the whole clause (the
reason for this solution being a constraint on transparent readings known as Generalisation X [8]):
(3) : : : w[ w [ Rafael is the winner ] ]
Therefore, a more careful argument should rather appeal to cases where (a part of) an argument,
not the main predicate, is elided or replaced with a pro-form.
Koralus’ cases are sloppy readings. Theworld-pronoun theorywould assign to (1) the LF roughly
as in
(11) Mike wanted w[ w [ [the winnerw] x[PRO meets x] ] ]
and might v[ Cathy wants w[ w [ [the winnerv] x[PRO meets x] ] ] ]
Given this, the elided part of (1) diﬀers from the licensor of ellipsis no more than in the value of
one world index, viz. that on the predicate winner (or, depending on the theory, the determiner the
that takes winner as its restrictor argument).
There are known cases of pronominalisation where the full denotational identity of the antecedent
and the pronoun is not observed; take, for instance, Karttunen’s [3] “paycheck sentence” (4) or
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Partee’s [7] example (5). Moreover, even ellipsis allows for “strict” and “sloppy” readings, as
illustrated (6) by Keshet’s [4] example.
(4) The man who gave his check to his wife was wiser than the man who gave it to his mistress.
(5) My home was once in Maryland, but now it’s in Los Angeles.
(6) Sherlock saw his hat. Watson did, too. ‘Watson saw Watson’s/Sherlock’s hat’
Thus we suggest that Koralus’s alleged counterexamples are evidence for the availability of sloppy
readings w.r.t. world pronouns and not for the falsity of the de dicto / de re ambiguity.
Speciﬁcity. There remains an issue which, for Koralus, constitutes additional evidence for the
absence of ambiguity. Namely, pronominalisation (in the sense of do so-replacement) seems to
ignore diﬀerences in speciﬁcity, as in
(7) John wants a lighter and so does Mary. John ends up stealing it and Mary buys one at the
cigar emporium.
While some technical work should be done in order to cope with this problem, it has to be borne
in mind that scope distinctions are not the only option to derive speciﬁcity contrasts, the alternative
being to use Hintikka’s Independence-Friendly Logic [1, 10, 12].
All in all, Koralus might have succeeded in his critique of the movement approach to the de dicto /
de re ambiguity but not as much in his refutation of the ambiguity itself.
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